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Abstract—Inspired by the boom of the consumer IoT market,
many device manufacturers, new start-up companies and tech-
nology behemoths have jumped into the space. Indeed, in a span
of less than 5 years, we have experienced the manifestation of an
array of solutions for the smart home, smart cities and even smart
cars. Unfortunately, the exciting utility and rapid marketization
of IoTs, come at the expense of privacy and security. Online and
industry reports, and academic work have revealed a number of
attacks on IoT systems, resulting in privacy leakage, property loss
and even large-scale availability problems on some of the most
influential Internet services (e.g. Netflix, Twitter). To mitigate
such threats, a few new solutions have been proposed. However,
it is still less clear what are the impacts they can have on the
IoT ecosystem. In this work, we aim to perform a comprehensive
study on reported attacks and defenses in the realm of IoTs
aiming to find out what we know, where the current studies
fall short and how to move forward. To this end, we first build
a toolkit that searches through massive amount of online data
using semantic analysis to identify over 3000 IoT-related articles
(papers, reports and news). Further, by clustering such collected
data using machine learning technologies, we are able to compare
academic views with the findings from industry and other sources,
in an attempt to understand the gaps between them, the trend
of the IoT security risks and new problems that need further
attention. We systemize this process, by proposing a taxonomy for
the IoT ecosystem and organizing IoT security into five problem
areas. We use this taxonomy as a beacon to assess each IoT work
across a number of properties we define. Our assessment reveals
that despite the acknowledged and growing concerns on IoT
from both industry and academia, relevant security and privacy
problems are far from solved. We discuss how each proposed
solution can be applied to a problem area and highlight their
strengths, assumptions and constraints. We stress the need for
a security framework for IoT vendors and discuss the trend of
shifting security liability to external or centralized entities. We
also identify open research problems and provide suggestions
towards a secure IoT ecosystem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is transforming many key
industries. Based on a recent estimation, the number of IoT
devices deployed worldwide will grow from 5 billion in
2015 to 24 billion in 2020, forming a global market of
$13 trillion dollars [1]. One of the key challenges faced
by the IoT ecosystem is privacy and security. While this
domain shares some problems with conventional wireless
sensor networks (WSN), it also has some unique traits. IoT
devices are user-centric, are Internet-connected and have more
complex software/hardware. As such, potential compromises
may cause serious harms (e.g., physical property damage [2],
bodily injuries [3], traffic accidents [4]). In addition, remote
adversaries become possible due to the connectivity of IoT
devices and can readily launch large-scale attacks [5], while the
complexities of IoT devices make security vulnerabilities harder
to be discovered. The severity and impact of the consequences
in tandem with the ease of performing scalable attacks, provide
adversaries with strong incentives to launch attacks.
Such IoT systems can be targeted towards either consumers
or enterprises following a business-to-consumer (B2C) or
business-to-business (B2B) model. However, consumer IoT
devices are likely more vulnerable compared to their industrial
counterparts that are usually selected and managed by profes-
sionals, protected by enterprise firewalls and intrusion detection
system (IDS), and their manufacturing is driven by legal and
liability contracts. In this work, we focus our attention on
IoT devices and systems of which target market consists of
end-user consumers. We leave the investigation of security in
enterprise IoT systems as future work.
Consumer IoT is an exciting topic not only for academia
but also for industry. In fact, individual researchers, industry
research labs and cyber-security firms have conducted their
own studies. Commonly, these works perform assessments on
IoT devices regarding their susceptibility to known attacks and
aim to determine whether they suffer from known security
issues. Therefore, these works tend to be publicized in white
papers, news articles, blog posts rather than appearing in major
security academic conferences. Hence, any study on IoT that
fails to take into account these works, will provide a very
conservative picture of IoT security.
This paper presents the first comprehensive investigation of
security for off-the-shelf IoT systems. The overall goal of our
study is to provide the research community with a panoramic
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view of state-of-the-art attacks on modern IoT systems and their
defenses, as well as to offer the key knowledge and insights
that will evolve the IoT security. Overall, our work systemizes
the knowledge of IoT security in the following aspects:
• Going beyond performing a regular research paper survey,
we collect literature from a wide range of sources including
academic publications, white papers, news articles, blog posts,
etc., to provide a more comprehensive picture of today’s IoT
security status. Note that collection of such data is by no
means trivial, due to the diversity in available information
sources, the huge volume of related web documents, and the
overlapping of the information from various sources. To address
these challenges, we develop a literature retrieval and mining
tool that automatically performs web page crawling, semantic
extraction, content filtering, and article clustering. The tool
generates high-quality clusters each representing a “story” of
IoT security that is used for subsequent classification and
analysis. Overall, our literature database consists of 3,367 white
papers, news articles, blog posts, together with 47 academic
papers we collect, resulting in 107 unique attack incidents
spanning from Q1 of 2010 to Q3 of 2016. All datasets we
collect and organized in this study will be made available
online [6]. The datasets will be updated periodically.
• After meticulously analyzing the literature from both the
academia and industry, we generalize IoT security attacks
into five problem areas: LAN Mistrust, Environment Mistrust,
App Over-privilege, No/Weak Authentication and Implemen-
tation Flaws. For each problem area, we conduct a detailed
investigation on its prevalence, severity, and root causes. We
apply the classification to existing defense strategies to align
the protection against the threats. Further, we propose new
taxonomies for both attacks and defenses based on various
properties such as their network communication channel, threat
model, stealthiness, and required modifications (for defense).
This brings out several insights such as the gap between
attacks and defenses and the discrepancy between the academic
research findings and industrial practices.
• Based on our detailed assessment, we make several key
recommendations for improving the state of the art. We identify
the need to solidify our understanding of the mechanics of
emerging IoT application platforms. We also suggest focusing
on threats stemming from the physical environment such as
working on voice authentication and gesture control authen-
tication. We identify lack of security solutions for connected
cars and suggest isolation of safety critical components from
other-purpose components in in-vehicle networks ad archi-
tectures. We further reveal an abundance of implementation
and authentication flaws in IoT devices and stress the need
for academia, industry and legislators to combine forces in
designing a security framework for IoT devices. Lastly, we
highlight the need for practical, backward compatible, device-
independent access control solutions that take into consideration
mobile and LAN adversaries in home networks.
Paper Organization. In Section II, we define our scope and
the players in the IoT ecosystem; in Section III, we present
our data collection tool and in Section IV we identify the five
main problem areas we discover; in Section V, we perform an
assessment on all collected IoT attacks while in Section VI,
we assess the solutions proposed by academia. In Section VII,
we present our insights and recommendations drawn from our
assessment. In Section VIII, we discuss some related work and
in Section IX, we conclude the paper.
II. CONSUMER INTERNET OF THINGS
In this section, we describe the focus of this work, provide
a general picture of the consumer IoT ecosystem, and define
the major entities it is comprised of.
A. Scope and Importance
The business model of IoT can be business-to-consumer
(B2C) or business-to-business (B2B). The former, builds
products for end-user consumers while the latter targets
enterprises. The focus of our study is B2C (or consumer)
devices. We believe that end-users are more vulnerable to
attacks on IoT since they lack the technical expertise and the
resources to deploy in-depth defense solutions that protect
them from potential adversaries. On the other hand, enterprises
usually enjoy the services of highly trained administrators who
can utilize firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS) with
complex security rules to ensure security and privacy within
the corporate network.
Moreover, enterprises usually follow strict protocols in
deciding which devices can be plugged-in the corporate
network. They are also commonly safeguarded by agreements
to protect them from damages incurred by defective devices
which exert pressure on IoT vendors in attesting the security
of their products. In contrast, companies targeting end-users
do not have security as a priority and are mostly driven by the
time-to-market. In fact, with the explosion and hype of IoT in
recent years, a large number of start-up companies entered the
space. Unfortunately, delivering a product first can make the
difference between the company’s success and demise. Note
that there are 357 such companies in home automation. More
importantly, the vast majority of them (167 out of 217 that
share their data), have less than 10 employees [7]. Obviously,
the priority is to make their products functional and deliver
them on time; focusing on security would be an expensive
and time-consuming endeavor, due to the need to hire security
experts and add security testing into their development cycles.
One may argue that IoT devices are not very different
from traditional embedded devices, or WSN devices. However,
despite their similarities, IoT devices have some unique
characteristics which affect their security. In particular they are
(a) user-centric, (b) Internet-connected and, (c) complex. Next,
we describe these characteristics.
• User-centric: IoT devices can play the role of actuators
and sensors which can act on or sense the user’s physical
environment. For example, some IoT devices are equipped
with a barometer that allows them to measure air pressure
in a room. Some others have motion sensors which enable
them to perceive movement in a room. Unlike WSN devices,
Fig. 1: Infrastructure of IoT ecosystem.
data from home automation sensors can reveal private user
information such as daily activities and presence in a physical
space. The former can be utilized by an adversary to profile
users while the latter can be utilized in committing theft. On
the other hand, actuator devices can assert a change in the
physical environment either directly or indirectly. For example,
a smart lock can be used to unlock the door of a house whereas
a smart thermostat can change the temperature in the room.
Again, unlike traditional WSN devices, these devices, once
compromised, could inflict serious damages to the user, by
allowing a thief to surreptitiously enter a house, or keep the
user in perennial hot temperatures which can further result in
a huge electricity bill.
• Internet-connected: IoT devices are connected to the
Internet. This connectivity can be direct: devices can gain
Internet connection through the cellular network. It can also
be indirect: devices can connect to the Internet through an
existing connected device (an IoT hub, a home router, or a
user smartphone in proximity). This Internet connectivity is
what allows the users to remotely control the devices and
set-up control rules for them. However, while this enables
automation advances and flexibility in control, at the same
time it opens new attack surfaces, allowing remote (Internet)
adversaries to perform large-scale attacks. For example, it
is reported that a botnet based on Mirai took control of
millions of Internet-connected home-automation devices with
authentication problems [5] and then used them in a massive
DDoS attack on a domain name server, rendering some of the
most popular Internet services unavailable for hours.
• Complex: Today’s IoT devices are complex. Instead of
residing on primitive hardware with microcontrollers and KBs
of memory (as sensor network motes a decade ago), today’s
IoT applications run on powerful hardware with full-blown
software stacks. As IoT systems become more sophisticated,
they may potentially expose more vulnerabilities that are not
easy to discover.
B. Infrastructure-based categorization
Figure 1 illustrates the IoT ecosystem. We identify three
entities in the ecosystem based on their responsibilities: user
interaction point (UIP) which receives user commands and
displays information; delegate/relay (D/R) which acts on
behalf of users to control IoT devices and/or relay data for
users and IoT devices; actuator/sensor (A/S) which changes
and/or senses the environment.
User interaction point plays the role of an interface between
user and end device. Commonly, UIP entity is assumed by
a smartphone. A mobile application developed by an end-
device vendor (or a 3rd party) is installed on user smartphones.
The user can interact with the mobile app to control the
device or get notifications from the device. However, some
devices can be controlled with physical buttons while others
interface with devices through a dedicated connected device.
For example, Amazon Echo accepts voice commands to control
other connected devices.
In some architectures, the user-initiated command is medi-
ated by a delegate/relay entity. For example, some devices are
backed by a cloud service which holds the aggregation logic for
various devices. This party is responsible for performing most
of the computation. A hub can also take this role, which can
work either in conjunction with the cloud service to integrate
various devices through diverse communication channels, or
perform the computation itself (e.g. Samsung’s SmartThings).
After some computation is performed, the final command
is delivered to an actuator. The actuator changes its state and
usually has some effect on the environment. For example, a
doorbell can produce sound, a camera can start recording and
a coffee machine can start brewing. Not surprisingly, this role
is assumed by IoT devices. Note that even though we use
a user-initiated command to describe the information flow,
these channels are bidirectional. For example, the connected
device can be a sensor which in effect senses changes in the
environment (e.g. motion or temperature). The information
is then delivered to a delegate/relay (hub, cloud or both)
which computes on the input. The users are notified of the
changes through their user interaction point. Things can get
more complicated with various integration protocols such
as IFTTT (if this then that) which allow the user to set
automatic command generation in response to environmental
changes. Nevertheless, the interaction can always be reduced
to the simple cases we describe here. For example, these
automatically-generated commands have to be set up by the
user and stored in the delegate/relay. Thus this process can be
viewed as an optimization which avoids forcing the user to
respond to a command whenever a notification is issued.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND MINING
Our work goes a step further than a traditional research
survey paper. In particular, we utilize data mining techniques
to collect literature from a variety of sources to draw a
comprehensive picture of IoT security. In this section, we
describe our methodology in collecting relevant literature and
mining web reports.
A. High-level approach
Our goal is to perform a detailed assessment of IoT attacks
and proposed solutions. A straightforward approach would be to
go through the works published in major security conferences
and manually pick those related to IoT security. However, this
approach would be incomplete. While most of the solutions
are proposed by academia, a large number of real-world
attack incidents and IoT device vulnerabilities are revealed
by individual researchers and cyber-security firms, which have
brought serious IoT vulnerabilities to light. When summarizing
and organizing the knowledge in IoT security, we don’t want
to miss out on these works. In this paper, we complement
academic works with literature from a wide range of other
sources including white papers, news articles, blog posts, etc.
This allows us to draw a comprehensive picture of the state-
of-the-art in IoT security (both at the attack and the defense
front). To our knowledge, no such SoK exists in the literature.
Collecting these works is a non-trivial endeavor. Most of the
attack incidents are published online and manually searching
for them does not scale since most of the search engine results
are either irrelevant or duplicates. In our work, we utilize
Google’s search engine APIs [8] and domain knowledge to
construct relevant queries. We further build a smart web crawler
which leverages those queries and meaningful combinations
of them, to automatically collect anything Google’s search
engine deems relevant. We then filter out irrelevant reports
using a set of heuristics. Next, we cluster reports together
utilizing state-of-the-art data mining techniques, to reveal the
high-impact reports. This results in 117 clusters with at least
3 web reports, which encompasses 973 web reports in total.
Lastly, we manually examine these reports to unearth 76 unique
attack instances.
There are many academic papers related to IoT security
as well. Since our purpose is to present the current status
of IoT research and identify future research areas, we try
to include all research works that are IoT security related
and cover various parties of the IoT ecosystem and different
communication channels. However, we exclude papers that
are not IoT-specific, for example, those focusing on finding
vulnerabilities or securing communication protocols in general.
In total, we manually collect 47 research papers: 24 of
them present offense studies on IoT systems. After manual
inspection, we find 31 unique attack instances in these papers
which complement the 76 incidents from our web reports for
a total of 107 unique attack instances. 30/47 research papers
present defenses to counter cyber-attacks on IoT. Note that
some papers might describe both attacks and defenses.
B. Collection of Web Reports
As mentioned before, collecting attack incidents reported by
industry and individual researchers is challenging, mainly due
to the variety of possible sources. To address this challenge, we
build a smart web crawler to collect white papers, news articles
and blog posts from the World Wide Web. We will refer to these
as web reports from now on. We first construct relevant queries
which our smart crawler automatically executes leveraging
Google Search APIs (query construction and search). Next,
our web crawler invokes a content parser module that runs
on the collected web reports to eliminate irrelevant results and
identify high-impact reports. Next, we describe these functions
in detail.
Query Construction and Search. Our smart web crawler
uses the Google search engine APIs to perform an initial
collection of candidate web reports. Obviously, the quality
of the results depends on the quality of the search queries.
One could naively use a large list of IoT-relevant keywords.
Following this approach, we end up with very noisy results: the
majority of the articles are not relevant to IoT security. In our
work, we follow a more systematic approach in constructing
such queries. In particular, we have constructed three keyword
sets: (a) general IoT keywords set; (b) brand devices set; (c)
security keywords set. The general IoT keywords set includes
keywords describing high-level categories of IoT devices, such
as “wearable”, “home automation”, etc. The brand devices set
includes the brand and name of an IoT device. We extract these
from two IoT product collection platforms (i.e. iotlist.co [9]
and smarthomedb.com [10]. Lastly, the security keywords set
includes words related to offensive security such as “hack”,
“vulnerability”, “malicious”, etc. We also include variations of
these words. For example, a noun can appear in its singular
and plural form (attacker, attacker-s) while a verb can appear in
its infinitive form, past tense and present participle (e.g. attack,
attack-ed, attack-ing). Our queries are automatically constructed
by the crawler which picks combinations of words from these
3 sets: For every word in set (a), a unique combination of 4
words from set (c) is picked. The process is repeated for every
word of the (b) set. This approach results in 2000 queries. For
every query, the crawler picks the first 100 results. We end up
with 100,000 unique URLs.
During this data collection, we observe that web articles
and news reports are usually published within a few days of
the release of the original incident (usually published through
a research paper, white paper, technical report or blog post).
However, the search engine results, tend to rank more recent
web reports higher. This leaves out older works which could in
principle be equally as important. To tackle this, we introduce
a time constraint to our queries: every query is repeated with a
time constraint spanning from the first week of the first quarter
of 2010 to the last week of the 3rd quarter of 2016. This results
in 17,000 more unique URLs for a total of 117,359 unique
URLs. All collected web reports are input into a database
which will be made available to the community [6] and will
be updated periodically.
Content Parser. Given the huge amount of web reports
collected by our smart crawler, finding attack incidents and their
original published source could be very challenging. To address
this, we build a content parser module which is composed of
two components: (1) a content filter and, (2) an article clustering
as illustrated in Figure 2.
1) Content Filter. The main purpose of the content filter is
to quickly eliminate the web reports that are not relevant to
consumer IoT security. The filter proceeds in two consecutive
phases. During the first phase, the content filter eliminates sites
Crawl
10K+ queries composed, 110K+ unique urls crawled.
Download
100G reports data downloaded.
Filter
3000+ reports are filtered out.
Cluster
117 clusters with at least 3 reports (973 articles in total).
Analyze
76 attack instances identified from 117 largest clusters.
Fig. 2: Workflow – Collection of web reports.
that are not web reports at all. During the second phase, it
eliminates web reports that are not relevant.
Upon manual inspection of the collected data, we observe
that web reports with no hyperlink are usually neither web
articles nor blog posts. For example, we find cases where a
collected report is merely a collection of keywords. Moreover,
sites with too many hyperlinks are either sitemaps or spam.
Finally, sites with too many dates tend to be report aggregation
sites. We use these observations in the first phase to eliminate
candidate reports which have no hyperlinks, have hyperlinks
which amount to more than half of the text, or have more
than 30 dates. The thresholds are set following a trial and
error approach. Next, the survived articles are further checked
to ensure that all keywords (or variations of them) from the
original query indeed appear in HTML source code. This
process results in a reduction from 117,359 candidate web
reports to 15,285. We manually sample 200 of the eliminated
URLs and inspect them. We find that 100% of them are true
negatives. Note that our goal in this phase is to reduce false
positives without eliminating interesting URLs. Evidently, our
approach is effective in achieving that.
The second phase of content filtering aims to perform a more
in-depth filtering. In particular, it focuses on the actual text
content of the candidate report to ensure its relevancy. At this
step, the parser utilizes diffbot [11] to extract the title, content,
author and publish date 1. Next, the tool checks again for the
presence of the original query keywords, but specifically in
the title and content of the report. This is needed to eliminate
cases where keywords appear in other places in the source
code, such as JavaScript or ads code. The second filtering phase
results in 3367 unique URLs. To validate the relevance of the
survived web reports, we randomly pick 300 of these reports
and check them. We find that 95% of them are indeed IoT
security related articles. We conjecture that the 5% error stems
from the extraction error of diffbot. For example, diffbot may
fail to exclude comments from the content. Thus a keyword (or
a combination of keywords) might appear in such extraneous
content which our tool will match.
2) Article Clustering. Once noise is eliminated from the
collected web reports, we focus on identifying high-impact
1diffbot can achieve 96.8% precision and 97.8% recall.
reports. To achieve this, we use clustering to aggregate web
articles reporting similar attack incidents.
We first process the title and content of each report to derive
a set of words. In order to capture the importance of the
title over the content, we assign it a Title Weight (TW). Then
we leverage standard natural language processing techniques
such as tokenization, removal of stopwords, stemming and
punctuation, number filtering, to derive a set of weighted words
from the title and content. Next, we extract features vectors
utilizing a keyword extraction algorithm tf-idf [12]. Finally,
we construct a distance matrix using cosine similarity of the
extracted feature vectors and generate a minimum spanning tree.
We prune the edges that don’t satisfy the Cluster Threshold
(CT) and get a forest wherein each tree is a cluster.
Selecting the optimal values for the Title Weight and the
Cluster Threshold is not straightforward. To address this, we
perform an evaluation of different combinations of TW and CT
values. We construct the ground truth by sampling 50 articles
that cover 15 different attack topics and manually label them
into different clusters. Then we try different combinations of
values to automatically cluster the 50 articles together with
the rest reports. The effectiveness of different combinations
is measured by the level to which those labeled articles are
correctly clustered together and separated in different clusters.
Based on this, we select the optimal values for TW and CT.
IV. IOT SECURITY PROBLEM AREAS
Our in-depth study of web reports and academic papers
resulted in a collection of IoT security issues. We identify
five major problem areas we find in the space, which form
the pillars of our detailed assessment described in subsequent
sections.
LAN Mistrust. A LAN Mistrust problem occurs when the IoT
device trusts the local network that is connected to (i.e., local
WiFi). In these scenarios, the IoT device does not take any
step into authenticating commands and requests. For example,
in a home area network, some devices rely on the network-
level authentication (e.g. WPA2-PSK), assuming that once a
device can authenticate to the network then it should be trusted.
However, this leaves them vulnerable to attacks from 3rd party
programs running on authenticated devices (e.g. smartphones,
laptops etc.).
Environment Mistrust. An environment mistrust problem
occurs when the IoT device trusts the physical environment
within which it is placed. Erroneous environment trust might
lead to physical attacks: an adversary can move the device
(point a camera into a different direction). Moreover, this
problem area encompasses threats stemming from a proximity
attacker who can use signals propagated at physical medium
(e.g. gestures or acoustic signals) to command the user
interaction point into executing an action.
App Over-privilege. A number of roles in the IoT ecosystem
can carry third-party apps. For example, smartphones allow
the installation of third-party apps which can control one or
more IoT devices; integration platforms such as Samsung
SmartThings allow developers to submit and users to install
smart apps to control their IoT devices. However, sometimes
these apps can manipulate the coarse granularity of their
systems’ authorization models to access devices and data they
are not supposed to. For example, any app on Android can
leverage side channels involving inertial measurement unit
(IMU) sensors to profile the device or the user; an app on
Android with Bluetooth permission can access any Bluetooth
device in the vicinity; an app with a subset of privileges on
an IoT device can perform unauthorized actions. Note that
we treat most of the smartphone app side-channel attacks as
possible due to over-privilege: an app should not be able to
access channels which reveal more information than the app’s
needs for its normal operations.
No/Weak Authentication. If a work is focused on exploiting or
addressing no/weak authentication issues, then it is applicable
to this problem area. For example, Bluetooth devices may use
the default 0000 or 1234 passwords during pairing. User
passwords could be subjected to dictionary attacks or can be
brute-forced within realistic time bounds. In general, if a target
entity does not use authentication at all then it is also applicable.
An instance of this problem could be an IoT device which
does not authenticate remote commands or firmware updates.
If an IoT device authenticates remote requests but does not
authenticate LAN requests, then this is reduced to a LAN
Mistrust problem.
Implementation Flaws. This problem area aims to capture
attacks and defenses targeting implementation flaws. Such
implementation flaws could include (a) leakage of hardcoded
credentials, (b) cross-site scripting (XSS), (c) open ports and
enabled debugging functionality and, (d) transferring sensitive
information over the network in plaintext.
As discussed above, some offensive works might have
multiple attack incidents that cover several problem areas. In
addition, some defense works could solve multiple problems
at the same time. During our analysis, we evaluate each attack
incident differently and discuss each defense solution in the
context of all applicable problem areas.
V. SECURITY HAZARDS OF IOT SYSTEMS
To systematically assess the current offensive works of
IoT security conducted by both industry and academia, we
propose and define 9 properties across which the works will
be compared. We further provide statistics to reveal trends
and assess the attack incidents collected in web reports and
academic papers.
A. Assessment Properties for Attacks
Our work performs an in-depth assessment of attacks on
the IoT ecosystem, which are reported in web reports and
academic papers. Our assessment utilizes some fundamental
pillars of evaluation (which we call properties) to systematically
study those works. Before elaborating on the results of the
assessment, we define the assessment properties.
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Fig. 3: Number of published vulnerabilities from 2010 to 2016.
Target Entity. As mentioned in Section II-B, the IoT ecosys-
tem consists of three main entities: (a) actuator/sensor (A/S);
(b) delegate/relay (D/R) and; (c) user interface point (UIP).
The A/S is typically the IoT device (A/S). The D/R could be
a hub or router (D/R), or a cloud server (D/R). Lastly, the
UIP is commonly the user’s smartphone (UIP) or a dedicated
interface IoT device (UIP).
Device Type. IoT devices can have diverse features and
functionalities. With this property, we aim to differentiate
among different types of devices. In particular, we classify each
attacked device in one of the following categories: (a) Home
automation devices; (b) Wearable devices (including wearable
medical devices); (c) Hubs and routers; (d) Smartphones and;
(e) Vehicles (including aftermarket IoT accessories such as
OBD (On-board diagnostics) dongles).
Threat Model. As usual, the threat model describes the
capabilities of adversaries. We categorize such adversaries
on IoT into five general categories. (a) Malicious app describes
an adversary who can install a malicious app on a user’s
smartphone, an IoT hub, an IoT device or an IoT backend
cloud server. (b) A LAN adversary is authenticated in the
LAN environment where the IoT devices are connected. Such
an adversary could be a guest device in the home network.
(c) A proximity adversary can take advantage of their spatial
proximity to an IoT device to attack the device. An example of a
proximity attacker could be one who sniffs BLE advertisements.
(d) A remote attacker can launch a remote (through the Internet)
attack on an IoT device or other parties. Lastly, (e) a physical
adversary is physically near the IoT device. For example, a
thief might rotate a security camera to make its field of view
not cover the point of interest.
Communication Channel. The communication channels en-
compass the different ways information can be exchanged
among the user or the user interaction point (UIP) and the
delegate/relay (D/R) or the IoT device (A/S) itself. We identify
five major communication channels: (a) WiFi; (b) Bluetooth; (c)
other wireless protocols such as Zigbee, Z-Wave, Thread, X10
Powerline; (d) the Internet channel for remote connections and
; (e) the physical medium which describes interactions that are
mostly sensed, in contrast with traditional network protocols.
Such channels can be acoustic signals, gestures and physical
touch.
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Fig. 4: Trend of attacks mined from 107 unique IoT attack incidents.
Direct Consequences. When an attack successfully launches,
it will incur (a) denial of service (DoS), if the service this
device provides is unavailable to users; (b) privacy leakage, if
the attack can acquire sensitive information of this device; (c)
function control, if the attacker can take control some or all of
the functions this device provides to users; (d) device control,
if the attacker can gain some privileges or capabilities this
device does not provide to users, for example running arbitrary
commands in shell.
Technique Scalability. An attack might be applicable to (a)
one device; (b) some devices; or (c) any device. For example,
if an attack requires physical access to a particular device then
we deem it to affect only one device at a time from a scalability
perspective. However, if the attack can affect multiple devices
at once (e.g. all devices connected to the LAN network) then it
is of the second category. Lastly, if the attack can be performed
remotely, at an Internet-wide scale, and every single device in
the system is affected then we assign the any device value to
the scalability property.
Stealthiness. This property aims to capture whether an attack
can be unnoticeable to the user. In particular, an attack can (a)
be unnoticeable, if the user can be completely unaware that the
attack has happened; (b) result in an environment change—the
attack results in a change in the environment (e.g. door opens,
temperature increases, bell rings, vehicle stops, etc.).
Responsible Disclosure. We also keep track of whether the
attacks have been reported to the affected vendors before their
publication. Responsible disclosure is paramount to provide the
vendor the opportunity to fix the problem before it becomes
public knowledge (and as such accessible by adversaries). We
collect such information from academic papers and online
articles which report the attack. If there is no mention of
vulnerability disclosure, we mark it as not specified.
Vulnerability Fix. When we examine responsible disclosure,
we also take notes on how vendors respond to this vulnerability
and whether the vendor did or will release a fix. This property
helps us identify which attacks the vendors deem as important
and whether it is feasible for them to fix the reported issues.
If there is no mention of vendor response or whether the
vulnerability is fixed, we mark it as not specified.
B. Trends of IoT Attack Incidents
Figure 3(a) plots the distribution of the 3367 collected IoT
security web reports, spanning from the first quarter (Q1) of
2010 until the third quarter (Q3) of 2016. Evidently, there is a
nearly exponential increase in web reports on an annual basis
reported in the WWW. This insinuates an increasing interest
in the industry and the media in IoT security.
After manually scrutinizing the contents of the web reports
in the 117 largest clusters we collect, we find 76 unique
attack incidents. Most of them are technical reports or blog
posts published by cyber-security companies and individual
researchers. These unique attack incidents, together with 31
unique attacks reported by 24 academic papers, are assessed
and discussed in detail in Section V-C. Figure 3(b) shows the
frequency distribution across time of the 76 attacks in web
reports and the 31 attacks revealed in academic papers. We do
observe that while there is an increase in web reports in 2016,
the unique incidents they report actually decrease from 2015.
This is because some web reports discuss incidents that happen
earlier in time. In addition, our analysis does not include Q4 of
2016. However, the takeaway here is that there is a significant
increase in attacks reported from both industry and academia
since 2010.
Our analysis on web reports also reveals the most reported
consequences of IoT attacks. As shown in Figure 4(a), the
increase in attacks can be mostly attributed to attacks which
result in device control, function control and—at a lesser
but also significant degree—privacy leakage. Device control
includes exploits that enroll IoT devices into botnets. Given
the recent massive DDoS attacks [5], a lot of web reports have
been focusing on that. Function control usually stems from a
lack of authentication on devices which can be manipulated
by an adversary. This is a low-effort attack since it does not
require the adversary to get root control on the device; it only
needs knowledge of the device APIs. Looking closer at those
issues, we found that most of the affected entities are the
IoT devices (A/S) themselves. We note that in those cases,
again full device control and function control are the prevalent
consequences (see Figure 4(b)). Increasingly, most attacks
target home automation devices (see Figure 4(c)). Wearable
security was a popular topic in the media and industry in 2015
with significantly fewer reports in 2016. Not surprising, the
most affected communication channels are WiFi and Internet.
The former is the most popular way of communication between
home automation A/S and a hub or router (D/R), while the
Internet is what allows those devices to be remotely controlled
(see Figure 4(d)). What this reveals is that there is an increasing
TABLE I: Assessment of Attacks on the Internet of Things
LAN Mistrust Environment Mistrust App Over-privilege No/Weak Authentication Implementation Flaw
R = Report count;
P = Paper count; Ref = References R P Ref R P Ref R P Ref R P Ref R P Ref
Total 3 2 [13][14] 5 5 [15][16][17][18][19] 0 8 [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27] 17 4 [15][28][29][30] 51 12 [31][32][33][34][29][35][36]
Target Entities
IoT device (A/S) 2 1 [14] 2 1 [15] 0 5 [21][22][23][26][27] 12 4 [15][28][29][30] 40 9 [31][33][34][29][35][36]
Hub and router (D/R) 1 1 [13] 1 0 0 0 3 0 5 3 [31][32]
Cloud server (D/R) 0 0 0 0 0 1 [20] 0 0 5 0
Smartphone (UIP) 0 0 1 3 [16][18][19] 0 2 [24][25] 1 0 0 0
IoT device (UIP) 0 0 1 1 [17] 0 0 1 0 1 0
Device
Type
Home automation 1 1 [14] 3 1 [15] 0 1 [20] 5 1 [15] 35 4 [31][33]
Wearable 1 0 0 1 [17] 0 5 [21][22][23][26][27] 7 1 [30] 8 1 [34]
Hub and router 1 1 [13] 1 0 0 0 3 0 5 3 [31][32]
Smartphone 0 0 1 3 [16][18][19] 0 2 [24][25] 0 0 0 0
Vehicle 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 [28][29] 3 4 [29][35][36]
Threat Model
Malicious app 0 0 0 2 [18][19] 0 8 [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27] 1 0 3 0
LAN 3 2 [13][14] 0 0 0 0 2 0 12 2 [33]
Proximity 0 0 4 3 [15][16][17] 0 0 7 3 [15][29][30] 13 2 [34][29]
Remote 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 18 4 [32][33][35]
Physical 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 [28] 5 4 [31][35][36]
Communication
Channel
WiFi 3 2 [13][14] 0 0 0 0 1 0 15 1 [33]
Bluetooth 0 0 0 1 [15] 0 1 [21] 5 2 [15][29] 1 2 [34][29]
Other wireless 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 1 [30] 8 0
Internet 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 20 5 [32][33][35]
Physical medium 0 0 3 2 [16][17][18][19] 0 0 1 1 [28] 4 4 [31][35][36]
Independent 0 0 0 2 0 7 [20][22][23][24][25][26][27] 0 0 3 0
Direct
Consequence
DoS 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 [36]
Privacy leakage 0 0 0 0 0 5 [22][23][25][26][27] 1 0 15 1 [34]
Function control 2 2 [13][14] 2 5 [15][16][17][18][19] 0 3 [20][21][24] 9 4 [15][28][29][30] 15 4 [31][32][29]
Device control 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 19 6 [31][33][35]
Technique
Scalability
One 0 0 1 2 [15][30] 0 0 3 2 [28][29] 8 6 [31][33][29][35][36]
Some 3 2 [13][14] 4 3 [17][18][19] 0 8 [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27] 14 2 [15][30] 33 6 [32][33][34][35]
Any 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0
Stealthiness
Unnoticeable 3 2 [13][14] 3 0 0 8 [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27] 14 2 [29][30] 46 11 [31][32][33][34][29][35]
Environment change 0 0 2 5 [15][16][17][18][19] 0 0 3 2 [28][15] 5 1 [36]
Responsible
Disclosure
Yes 3 0 2 1 [15][18] 0 1 [20] 9 2 [15][29] 5 6 [33][29][35]
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
Not specified 0 2 [13][14] 3 3 [16][17][19] 0 7 [21][22][23][24][25][26][27] 8 2 [28][30] 26 6 [31][32][34][36]
Vulnerability
Fix
Yes 2 0 2 1 [15] 0 1 [20] 7 1 [15] 23 2 [35]
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0
Not specified 1 2 [13][14] 3 4 [16][17][18][19] 0 7 [21][22][23][24][25][26][27] 8 3 [28][29][30] 20 10 [31][32][33][34][29][36]
interest in the security and privacy of home automation devices
using WiFi and Internet.
Next, we perform an in-depth assessment of all unique attack
incidents reported by both industry and academia.
C. Attack Incidents Analysis
We organize our assessment on IoT attacks around the main
problem areas we identify (see Section III for definitions). This
assessment is carried out based on the properties we defined
earlier in this Section. Table I summarizes our analysis. Next,
we discuss important observations stemming from this analysis.
LAN Mistrust. This problem arises in attacks using WiFi as
their communication channel and with the main target being
IoT devices, hubs and routers. For example, in [14], [37],
the adversary takes advantage of their position in the same
network as the target IoT device. Due to the reliance on WiFi
authentication, the target IoT devices do not take any extra
measures to authenticate requests from devices on the same
network, leaving them vulnerable to a local adversary. We
further observe that this kind of attacks commonly achieve
function control [14] and are mostly stealthy [14], [37], [38].
This happens because the adversary is implicitly trusted to
use the control interface of the device resulting in expected
operations but maybe in opportunistic moments. The threat
model is as expected the LAN, since this problem manifests
in connected smart home devices [14], [37], [39].
Some IoT vendors trust devices on the same local network,
leaving them vulnerable to local adversaries.
Environment Mistrust. This problem stems from proximity
attackers which achieve function control [40], [16], [18], [19]
and availability attacks [41] on their targets. In fact, 40% (2/5)
of the observed DoS attacks on devices are possible because of
an implicit trust of the environment. In both cases, the attacks
used close-range jamming signals to render their targets non-
operational [41]. Such DoS attacks can be—according to our
stealthiness definition—unnoticeable, since they do not affect a
change to the environment. However, the user might eventually
notice the offense since the device will be unresponsive. All
other cases do affect the environment: for example, in [40] an
adversary can use a speaker which produces synthetic voice
commands to control a smart TV, while [15] describes how a
Bluetooth smart lock on the main entrance can unlock when
the device owner enters home through the garage door. It
is also evident from our analysis that at least 50% of the
attacks targeting user interaction point (UIP) can be linked
to erroneous environment mistrust issue. This is partially due
to attacks on emerging usable interfaces of IoT devices, such
as those using voice and gesture signals. For example, users
can now utilize voice assistants to control IoT devices (e.g.
Google Now on Android phones, Cortana on Windows, Siri
on iPhones and MACs and even Alexa on the Amazon Echo
device). Despite advances in speech recognition, it seems that
we lack good solutions to authenticate such acoustic signals,
leaving the systems vulnerable to record and replay attacks. In
fact, [16] demonstrates how acoustic signals emanating from a
speaker, can be incomprehensible from a human but correctly
interpreted and executed by such voice assistants.
Home automation devices tend to suffer from environment
mistrust problems stemming from emerging unauthenticated
control signals, such as voice.
App Over-privilege. Interestingly, none of our collected web
reports discuss attacks that fall within this problem area.
Conversely, a large body of academic works exist. We believe
this happens partially because these problems stem from more
sophisticated adversaries which utilize side-channel techniques
or perform inference attacks to exploit the failure of IoT
systems and application platforms to enforce least privilege.
Such attacks typically assume an adversary that can place a
malicious app on either a user interaction point (UIP) [22],
[24], [25] or cloud server of an IoT hub [20]. Such adversaries
do not rely on a particular communication protocol and are
typically stealthy. [24] focuses on the coarse granularity of
the Android permission system which allows any app with a
permission to surreptitiously access Bluetooth, NFC, Audio and
Internet devices. Some malicious apps achieve manipulation of
IoT devices’ interfaces to instruct them to perform unauthorized
operations. For example, in [20], a malicious battery monitor
SmartApp could subscribe door lock PIN change event by
leveraging over-privilege problem on SmartThings platform.
However, in most of the cases, the adversaries are passive,
aiming to compromise data confidentiality. For example, a
malicious app could use accelerometer, gyroscope and magne-
tometer on a smartwatch to infer ATM PIN key entries with
more than 90% accuracy after three trials [26].
App over-privilege problem on smartphones is well studied
in academia, however, it does not attract much attention
from industry. It manifests in multi-application platforms
(e.g. smartphones, hub) and is typically exploited by more
sophisticated adversaries who perform side-channel and
inference attacks.
No/Weak Authentication. End IoT devices typically suffer
from authentication problems. For example, [42] discusses how
the Insteon hub does not authenticate by default remote requests,
which allows an adversary to control any device connected
to the hub. Almost 40% of the cases involve a proximity
adversary using Bluetooth to attack wearables [29], [30], [43],
[44] and other personal devices [45]. This is usually due to
weak authentication mechanisms at the Bluetooth protocol
level—devices either do not require a PIN [43] or allow a
weak PIN that can be brute-forced [44]. To make things worse,
vendors fail to implement authentication on the application
layer [29]. On the other hand, a remote adversary uses the
Internet to attack problematic home automation devices [46].
These attacks oftentimes result in full control of the vulnerable
IoT device. For example, researchers found that Ubi runs
an ADB (Android Debug Bridge) service and a VNC service
(providing access to the Android UI) with no password [47]. By
leveraging this vulnerability, an attacker could gain root access
on this device. Vehicles and their aftermarket IoT accessories
also perform weak or no authentication. In [28] the adversary
is assumed to tap into the controller area network (CAN bus)
to control some of the car functions without authentication
while in [48] the adversary places an OBD dongle to control
some of the target car’s features. However, in both cases, the
adversary is assumed to have physical access to the vehicle. A
major problem here is the lack of isolation between electronic
components in the vehicular network which share the same
bus.
No/weak authentication is a serious issue on consumer
IoT devices. Bluetooth-enabled devices have been widely
reported as vulnerable by industry. An area of interest
attracting researchers from both industry and academia are
authentication issues in emerging in-vehicle networks. This
can be attributed to the severe consequences of potential
attacks.
Implementation Flaw. Most of the attacks on IoT devices
are due to implementation flaws. Adversaries on the same
LAN can exploit open ports [49] to gain control of devices.
Adversaries can also perform their attacks remotely exploiting
either XSS vulnerabilities [32], SSL flaws [50] or hardcoded
credentials [51]. For example, some vendors provide tutorials to
users, guiding them to set up port forwarding to enable remote
control [52]. However, if the devices are vulnerable, this allows
remote attackers to exploit this attack surface to break into the
device and in extend the local network. Unfortunately, a lot of
IoT vendors follow this practice, which is problematic as we
discuss later in VII. The LAN adversary model seems to be
interesting only to the industry and the media while the remote
model is studied by both. A reason for this could be the fact that
remote adversary entails higher risk since it requires less effort
and assumptions about the adversary’s capabilities. In addition,
implementation flaw problems seem to be the main focus for
the industry and the media—more than 50% of the reported
attacks are possible due to implementation flaws. Such flaws
manifest in home automation devices, such as light bulbs [53]
and thermostats [54], and are in a large extend attributed to
hardcoded credentials in the devices’ firmware [33], [55], lack
of validation of firmware updates [35], or unencrypted traffic
that exposes credentials [47]. While, device-specific, these
problems also result in severe consequences: In fact, most of
the attacks which result in full device control (25/34) are due
to implementation flaws. Moreover, such flaws enable scalable
attacks: we found 9/10 attack cases that can be potentially
applied to “any device”, to be possible due to implementation
flaws. For example, [49] discovers that the website of a baby
monitor device has a vulnerability which allows an adversary
to login and view camera details of any other user. Interestingly,
for a lot of reported attack cases, we do not find any vendor
response. Note also that even if the vendor did respond with a
software update, the update is not necessarily adopted by the
users. A prominent example is the Mirai botnet [56] which
is linked to the recent massive DDoS attack on an Internet
domain name server. Mirai exploits vulnerabilities in Internet-
connected smart home devices to conscript them in a botnet
and perform the DDoS attack. While the Mirai code was made
available months ago [57], and despite some vendor reaction
(some offered security patches a year ago [58]), a lot of users
never applied the security updates to their devices, allowing
the attack to succeed. To make things worse, sometimes a
software update cannot solve the problem, and vendors need
to recall the vulnerable devices [59]. This is a process which
might cost the manufacturer a lot of money and stigmatize
their brand name; it also relies on users to make the effort
to return the device. Lastly, we observe that all the attacks
that do not report to vendors are exploiting implementation
flaws. This might happen because the vulnerability founders
aim to profit from them. For example, a cyber-security research
firm who discovered implementation flaws in medical devices,
partnered with an investment firm to profit by damaging the
device vendor’s stock price [60].
Moreover, many IoT gadgets can be controlled by smart-
phone apps that may introduce new attack surfaces. Motivated
by this, we perform static code analysis on 323 IoT apps
crawled from Google Play. Our results are alarming: nearly
90% of the apps trigger at least one security/privacy policy
violation. For example, 44% of the apps do not use encryption
to protect their data, and about half the apps have at least
one SSL/TLS related issue or do not use SSL at all. Overall,
the status quo for IoT security is far from being optimistic
even on the standard Android platform. One may expect the
situation to be worse on custom platforms/OSes for IoT. Due
to space constraints, the details of the analysis are presented
in Appendix A.
One of the main sources of problems in IoT devices is
implementation flaws. However, even when problems are
reported or publicized, and vendors do provide a fix, this is
not always applied by users. Hence, a lot of devices suffer
from known issues, enabling attacks which can result in
serious consequences such as full device control.
VI. SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR IOT SYSTEMS
In scrutinizing the defenses for IoT, we identify various
approaches. (a) Authentication (Auth): these commonly employ
app-level or end-to-end authentication. (b) Access control: these
works propose—and sometimes implement—access control
schemes to improve management and security of IoT devices.
Typically these approaches are independent of the IoT device
software and hardware architecture; instead, they depend on a
centralized entity (e.g. delegate/relay) to enforce access control
policies. (c) Embedded Device Security (EDS): these works
mainly focus on buttressing the security of the IoT devices
themselves by proposing new system architectures. Commonly
these require specialized hardware since they borrow concepts
from the trusted platform computing (TPM) domain to enable
device attestation from a verifier. (d) Device Attestation (DA):
they are similar to EDS approaches but they do not necessarily
rely on secure hardware. Instead, the verifier might utilize either
the root of trust guaranteed provided by EDS or environment
signals to attest to the integrity of messages rather than
the integrity of the device hardware/software. (e) Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) : these approaches are more passive
in nature and mainly focus on detection (traffic monitoring)
rather than prevention. Commonly, they overhaul the network
traffic/activity to detect a compromise. (f) Information flow
(IF): these approaches control the information flow based
on different sensitivity levels. (g) Other: approaches which
are typically outside the computer and network realm (e.g.
manufacturing/mechanical).
In this section, we take a closer look into the IoT defense
works, propose assessment properties and perform a security
analysis focused on the problem areas they tackle.
A. Assessment Properties for Defenses
To better understand the proposed defenses by researchers,
we utilize the problem area (see Section IV), and the target
entity, threat model and communication channel properties
(see Section V-A). In addition to these, we further define
properties which as particular to IoT defense approaches,
namely modification; backward compatibility and; user
interaction. Next, we define these properties.
Modification. The modification property aims to capture the
hardware and software requirements of the proposed solution. In
terms of hardware, a solution might require either (a) changes
to the hardware of the existing system entities or (b) the
TABLE II: Assessment of Defenses for the Internet of Things
Auth Access Control EDS DA IDS IF Other
[30] [61] [62] [14] [15] [21] [63] [64] [24] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [25] [80] [81] [82] [83] [17]
Problem Area
LAN mistrust
Environment mistrust
App over-privilege
No/Weak authentication
Implementation flaw
Target Entity
IoT device (A/S)
Hub and router (D/R)
Cloud server (D/R)
Smartphone (UIP)
IoT device (UIP)
Threat Model
Malicious app
LAN
Proximity
Remote
Physical
Communication
Channel
WiFi X
Internet X
Bluetooth X
Physical X
Independent X
Others X
Modification
Hardware X
New hardware X
OS update X
Application X
Backward Compatibility X
User
Interaction
No
Bootstrap
Prompt
= fully applies; = applies in some cases; = does not apply; X = not specified.
addition of new hardware into the environment. For example,
a TPM approach for an IoT device will require a secure chip
on the existing hardware, while a framework to control access
to various IoT devices, might require the addition of a new
hub which has support for various communication channels. In
terms of software, a solution might require (c) an OS update
(e.g. router firmware changes) or (d) application changes (e.g.
app installation on a user’s smartphone).
Backward Compatibility. This property aims to describe
whether a solution is backward compatible or not. We regard
a solution as backward compatible if when the solution is
applied, the target devices gain the protection benefits without
the need of replacing the devices themselves. Some systems
could be partially backward compatible if an update is needed
but can be applied over the air.
User Interaction. Some solutions require (a) no user interac-
tion; (b) interaction only to bootstrap the system; or (c) prompt
users for making decisions. For example, a TPM solution for an
IoT device is typically completely transparent to users. On the
other hand, some access control schemes and traffic monitoring
techniques require users to setup the access control policies
once to bootstrap the system; others prompt users to make
decisions during enforcement.
B. Proposed Solutions Analysis
We categorize the defenses according to the problem areas
they solve. We utilize the defined properties to perform an
in-depth assessment of the approaches used and summarize our
results in Table II. Next, we discuss the main insights drawn
from this assessment.
LAN Mistrust. Two works can solve this problem for the
systems they consider [63], [72]. [72] focuses on a home
environment where a visitor who is authenticated to the network
attempts to compromise devices on the local network. The
authors perform a user study to determine access control
policies for LAN devices. However, there is no discussion
on how these can be implemented and enforced and as such
we could not assign values to most of the properties. [63]
proposes an end-to-end authentication and capability-based
access control model which can thwart attacks from LAN,
proximity and remote adversaries. However, every device needs
to update its firmware and be authenticated to other devices
it wants to communicate with. If a user owns several devices,
setting up all devices and assigning the correct capabilities
could be a laborious endeavor.
End-to-end authentication and access control are both
effective in solving LAN Mistrust issues. However, the former
relies on a universal implementation of the protection by all
IoT vendors. Lastly, we note the absence of practical access
control solutions that solve the LAN Mistrust issue.
Environment Mistrust. Various approaches have been pro-
posed to solve environment mistrust issues. Two out of five
are device attestation solutions. [76] uses visual challenges
(e.g. QR codes) to verify the freshness of camera footage. The
goal is to detect adversaries who have tampered the camera to
provide obsolete videos. The proposed solution only partially
solves this problem: an attacker could bypass the system by
physically moving or rotating the camera to keep it away
from the target area, while at the same time keeping the
visual challenge in sight. It further requires the addition of at
least one new device (a verifier) which verifies the challenge.
[77] does focus on physical adversaries who tamper WiFi IoT
devices by moving or rotating them. The solution leverages
the 802.11n WiFi frame preamble to detect tamper events.
Unfortunately, their technique, while easy to deploy (just a
software update) is not very effective: it is only proven to detect
53% of the tamper events. Moreover, solutions following a
device attestation approach commonly need to prompt the user
on any detected event. The access control solution [15] aims to
protect Bluetooth-enabled smart locks from a physical attacker
or an attacker in proximity. The proposed solution requires
hardware changes to the smart locks and a new wearable device
to be carried by the users. This renders it hard to deploy. [83]
proposes an information flow approach to solve attacks using
malicious voice commands. However, it is vulnerable to voice
replay attacks. [62] proposes a liveness detection system for
voice authentication on smartphones, working against replay
voice attacks. It utilizes the time-difference-of-arrival changes
to the two microphone of the smartphone when a human speaks.
While effective, it does require the phone to be placed at a
specific position. Lastly, [17] tries to prevent privacy leakage
from head mounted displays (e.g. Google Glass). The paper
proposes adding a polarized lens in front of the display to
prevent its reflection which can be potentially interpreted by
a proximity adversary. We observe that most of the solutions
in this space focus on proximity or physical adversaries since
there is an implicit relationship between the capabilities of such
adversaries and the problems they can induce to IoT systems.
Environment mistrust problems are very specific to IoT
devices which can be placed in diverse physical environments.
Different approaches can be followed to solve the problem
but are highly dependent on the application. Complete solu-
tions need to consider physical adversaries to be effective.
App Over-privilege. This problem typically arises due to the
coarse granularity of the protection mechanisms of entities
that support multiple applications. These could be UIPs (e.g.
smartphones) or D/Rs (e.g. hubs), which support third-party
apps. Three main approaches have been followed to mitigate
this kind of problems. Dabinder [21], SEACAT [24] and
Xapp [65] propose access control solutions. In particular [24]
proposes modifications to the Android OS on smartphones,
to support application-level access control to Bluetooth, NFC
and audio devices in the vicinity. AppGuardian [25] detects
and prevents privacy being leaked from connected devices or
other apps to malicious apps. It achieves that by blocking apps
which continuously poll system resources in an attempt to
gain inference through side-channel information. In contrast
with the access control approaches, it requires no system
modifications—the solution is deployed in the form of a third-
party app. FlowFence [81] on the other hand targets emerging
IoT application frameworks. It proposes an information flow
approach to prevent over-privilege third-party apps from
misusing the end IoT devices of the framework. We observe
that access control approaches require some user involvement
to setup the policy rules but after that enforcement happens
transparently. On a par with Dabinder and SEACAT, FlowFence
also needs user aid in setting up the policies: the user needs to
approve the developer issued flow rules. [82], [83] also propose
information flow approaches that separate highly sensitive
information from less sensitive information and apply access
control to each flow. AppGuardian, as an IDS approach, might
continuously prompt the user if an app is frequently accessing
system resources and cannot be killed. We also note that all
of the approaches in solving the app over-privilege problem
can be effective and backward compatible. An exception is
[65] which assumes that participating devices use a modified
version of the OSGi framework.
App over-privilege problems generally stem from design
issues (e.g.failure to achieve the least privilege principle).
Therefore, they typically require vendors to significantly
modify the system in order to eradicate the problem.
No/Weak Authentication. A straightforward way to address
these problems is to add end-to-end or application-level
authentication. MASHaBLE [61] and FitLock [30] follow
such approaches. They both target Bluetooth devices and
as such, they consider a proximity threat model. They are
also backward compatible but have different levels of user
interaction. FitLock asks the user to setup the device in
her account and enters a generated code for validation. In
contrast, MASHaBLE enables cryptographic secret handshakes
for mutual authentication among BLE supported devices (e.g.
smartphones). Such approaches are indeed effective in solving
the problem, however, they are application specific which
delegates trust to app developers. Given the plethora of
problems stemming from implementation flaws, relying solely
on app developers for securing IoT could be catastrophic.
Conversely, [14], [63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70],
[71] follow an access control approach to effectively tackle
no/weak authentication problems. In this cases, trust is moved
from IoT app developers to the D/Rs and UIPs, effectively
reducing the trusted computing base of the ecosystem. An
exception is [64] which only partially solves the problem.
While it offers device-level authentication, it fails to guarantee
app-level authentication. Most of these solutions focus on IoT
devices that can be controlled through the Internet (remotely)
and WiFi (locally) (9/10). Some (3/10) can solve authentication
issues on Bluetooth devices: IACAC [63] is a capability-
based access control scheme implemented on WiFi but can be
extended to the Bluetooth protocol. Thus to be deployed, the
participating devices will need to update their protocol software
stacks. [67], [71] extends the OSGi framework to built an
access control mechanism supporting various communication
protocols such as X10, Insteon, Zigbee, UPnP. The OSGi (Open
Service Gateway Initiative) framework was used by various
works [65], [67], [71]. This is a modular service platform
for the Java programming language which while proposed for
gateways, it can be used in other devices such as smartphones
and automobiles. Its extensible structure allows for over the
air updates and integration of heterogeneous protocols. On the
other hand, it is not widely deployed, and as such it would
require firmware updates on all participating devices.
Lastly, [80] is an intrusion detection approach for a vehicular
network. In particular, the paper considers a compromised ECU
(electronic control unit) connected to the CAN (controller
area network) bus of the car. It uses the intervals of periodic
messages on the CAN bus as a signal to profile ECU units
and detect anomalies. This can help detect issues in in-vehicle
networks stemming from authentication problems but cannot
prevent damage.
In general, access control approaches are effective in tackling
no/weak authentication problems and are independent of IoT
vendors. However, they do require users to be involved in
bootstrapping the system by helping with the setup of access
control policies.
Implementation Flaws. Most of the access control solutions,
apart from being effective in tackling no/weak authentication
problems, they can also partially solve implementation flaws,
for example, open port flaws. An access control solution such
as [71] can protect the device since it will block remote requests
from unauthorized parties. In fact most of these solutions, focus
on a remote adversary [14], [66], [67], [69], [70], [71] which
performs the attack across the Internet. This is incomplete
since they seem to disregard, local threats such as malicious
apps running on smartphones. For example, [70] assigns to
an access point located one hop away from the target IoT
device, the responsibility of securely tunneling the traffic to
mitigate privacy leakage. In this case, if the device erroneously
transfers sensitive information in plaintext (e.g. through HTTP),
the solution will effectively tackle a remote adversary who
passively eavesdrops on the traffic. However, a local threat
might eavesdrop on the link between the device and the first hop
compromising the confidentiality of the data in transit. Some
other access control solutions can be more effective in tackling
implementation flaws. For example, BLE-Guardian [64] pro-
tects BLE devices by employing reactive jamming to hide BLE
advertisements of these devices. This approach is effective for
BLE: even if devices have implementation flaws, an external
adversary cannot even discover the vulnerable device. On the
other hand, on a par with [21], a co-installed malicious app
on the BLE device could potentially succeed.
Fitlock [30] redesigns binding and uploading data procedures
on a Bluetooth device (Fitbit), and provides an end-to-end au-
thentication solution. This approach can solve implementation
flaws on the IoT device when facing a proximity attacker.
However, the firmware of the IoT device needs to be updated
to adopt the protection.
Both [73], [74] employ an EDS approach. While they can
protect against very powerful adversaries (see threat model),
they can only partially solve implementation flaws. For example,
even if an adversary exploits implementation flaws, these ap-
proaches would prevent system-level tampering, however, they
can neither detect nor prevent attacks exploiting open ports to
gain app-level function control. Moreover, EDS approaches can
be applied to any device, whether this is an A/S, a D/R or a UIP.
They are also mostly independent of communication channels
since they focus on device security and not communication
security. In addition, they act transparently to the user. However,
they do require special hardware and as such are not always
backward compatible. In general, EDS approaches can provide
the means or tools to applications to attest to the integrity of
the platform or themselves. They can prevent an exploit from
escalating its privileges to system privileges, but the apps are
responsible for their own security.
Device attestation approaches also partially solve imple-
mentation flaws but do not necessarily require hardware
modifications. For example, SEDA [75] and SANA [78] can
effectively attest IoT device swarms against software attacks.
Lastly, the IDS approaches usually facilitate detection of a
compromise, but only after it has taken place.
In essence, although a lot of academic works can solve
some implementation issues with IoT devices, this is not their
main focus. This is partially because these issues are not very
interesting from an academic perspective. These works opt in
studying more fundamental design issues as discussed before.
Nevertheless, implementation flaws are a non-trivial problem
in IoT and we need practical solutions. An easy fix would be
to update the vulnerable target entities. This assumes at least
that the vulnerability is known to the vendor and that an over
the air update is supported. The problem here is that these are
not always valid assumptions and that such an approach relies
on a diverse set of multiple IoT vendors who do not always
treat security as a priority.
Implementation flaws are a non-trivial problem in IoT and we
lack practical, device independent and backward compatible
solutions.
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR IOT SECURITY
In the previous sections, we elaborate our study on the
existing attacks on IoT systems (Section V) and the defenses
against such threats (Section VI). Based on the observations
obtained from the study, here we present what we have learned
and what needs to be done in this new area.
A. OBSERVATION: Emerging IoT Application Platforms Be-
come New Attack Targets
Our study highlights the emerging threats to the vulnerable
delegate/relay targets (20/107). These targets are the IoT
application platforms developed by IoT industry, such as
Samsung’s SmartThings [84], Weave [85] and MiOS [86].
Although so far there is little evidence that indeed these
platforms are exploited in the real world—mainly because
these systems are relatively in their infancy—still the threats
they are facing are real. Just as potentially harmful apps have
already become the main threat to mobile platforms (Android
and iOS), it is imaginable that in the near future, the IoT
platforms can easily fall victim to similar attacks. In fact,
recent studies [20] show the possibility of the attacks from
over-privileged applications on those platforms. However, based
on what we have collected, apparently, these emerging threats
have not yet been extensively investigated.
SUGGESTION: More extensive and thorough studies are
expected on the security of IoT application platforms,
helping better understand their weaknesses and enhance
their protection (isolation, access control) before real attacks
happen, without undermining their utilities.
B. OBSERVATION: No Protection for IoT User Interaction
Points
The most common way to control IoT devices is through
the user’s smartphone. However, in an attempt to streamline
the process, more and more vendors provide other channels
to help the user better manage her devices. A prominent
example is Amazon Echo, a connected device which accepts
an acoustic signal, translates it into commands (just like the
smartphone services such as Google Now, Siri and Cortana)
and further relays them to the corresponding device’s cloud
service. Another example is the gesture based control [87], [88],
[89] being developed by vendors. The use of these techniques,
however, also exposes IoT systems to new risks: if such physical
communication channels (e.g., voice, gesture) are not properly
mediated, an adversary could issue arbitrary commands to
control connected devices. As an example, a study [16] already
demonstrates how a malicious device could construct and issue
acoustic signals which while incomprehensible by humans, are
accepted by voice assistants. These emerging challenges could
render Environment Mistrust problems increasingly important
for IoT. However, little has been done to understand how to
protect such systems against such threats.
SUGGESTION: Threats from the physical environment of
IoT systems are understudied. The security risks of new
control interfaces (e.g., voice, gesture) need to be better
understood and effectively protected.
C. OBSERVATION: Lack of Security Solutions for Connected
Cars
According to Business Insider, the sale of connected cars
is expected to grow rapidly, with estimated 45% of the
cars on the road to be connected by 2020 [90]. Google,
Ford, Uber and Tesla are among the most prominent players
experimenting with various levels of autonomous driving. In
order to enable such capabilities, a large number of sensors
and electronic components will be extensively deployed, which
opens new attack surfaces with significant impacts. As an
example, a prior study [29], [35] reveals vulnerabilities in
aftermarket dongles, which allow an adversary to assume
control of vehicles. For another example, [28] shows how
an adversarial or compromised ECU unit can attack other
components connected to the CAN bus of legacy vehicles. More
recently, even next generation vehicles (e.g. Tesla) are found to
be vulnerable [91]. Evidently, the existing in-vehicle computer
and network infrastructure are not yet ready to guarantee the
security of their components. Vulnerabilities in vehicles are
serious and can even cost human lives. Our work shows that
more needs to be done to mitigate the threats to vehicular
sensors, networks and architectures.
SUGGESTION: In the next few years connected cars
will be all around us. This highlights the importance of
studying the security of electronic components in vehicular
networks. A possible direction would be the design of new
in-vehicle network architectures that isolate safety critical
components from infotainment and other functions. Any
solution here should guarantee the availability of security
critical components, the integrity of their messages and
authentication of remote commands.
D. OBSERVATION: Pervasiveness of Implementation Flaws
and No/Weak Authentication
Our analysis reveals a significant number of attacks ex-
ploiting either implementation flaws or no/weak authentication
issues in commercial IoT devices. In fact, 62/103 of all attacks
are made possible because of the former and 19/103 because of
the latter. To make things worse, such attacks can have severe
impacts on the society: the Mirai botnet exploits such flaws in
online devices to enroll them in large scale DDoS attacks. A
version of Mirai recently conducted a massive DDoS attack
in the US, rendering high profile online services (e.g. Twitter,
Netflix, Amazon, PayPal) unavailable for hours. Our analysis
on defense shows that there is no panacea for these kinds of
problems.
The manifestation and plethora of implementation flaws
demonstrate that the whole IoT industry is yet to mature,
with most products produced by start-ups, which oftentimes
have little resource and incentive to build well thought-out
security protection. In fact, we found that out of 357 home
automation companies who provide statistical data, more than
3/4 (167/217) are small businesses with less than 10 employees,
42/217 have between 11-50 and less than 5% (7/217) have
more than 50, which indicates the immaturity of this domain.
Given the stringent competition, delivering a product/feature
is often the top priority. Unfortunately, security commonly
pays the price due to the lack of or negligent code reviews,
or in most of the cases lack of a security vision/plan in the
development process.
SUGGESTION: Industry experts, legislators and academics
should come together to design a secure framework for
consumer IoT devices. The existence of such a framework
with security standards that IoT vendors have to adhere by
would help reduce the trivially and massively exploitable
vulnerabilities.
E. OBSERVATION: Access Control Solutions Are Effective but
Incomplete
While a secure framework solution would go a long way
in eradicating most of the implementation flaws, there will
always be devices that lack protection. In fact, a lot of solutions
proposed on academic papers seem to shift responsibility to
the delegate/relay (either the router, cloud or local hub) which
takes on the challenge of integrating a diverse set of devices
with heterogeneous protocols in a common management
and access control framework. These approaches reduce the
trusted computing base since they are independent of the IoT
vendor practices. Moreover, this independence allows them
to effectively protect access on devices, irrespective of the
presence of implementation flaws in them. Nevertheless, our
study on such access control based defense reveals that the
existing access control approaches commonly do not solve the
LAN Mistrust problem. This is because the vast majority of
them are restricted to a remote adversary, taking no measure
against internal (within LAN) threats. For example, an IoT
device itself could be compromised or malicious by design [33].
In addition, smartphones carry apps from multiple and not
always verified sources. Thus a malicious app on an authorized
phone might attack any device on the LAN. Our study on
attacks already illustrates the existence of such LAN Mistrust
attacks.
SUGGESTION: Traditional LAN network solutions are too
coarse-grained. There is a lack of fine-grained, IoT device-
independent solutions. Access control defense employed
within the LAN can solve the LAN Mistrust and No/Weak
Authentication problems and mitigate most of the attacks ex-
ploiting implementation flaws. Nevertheless, while academia
has been studying access control schemes for years, we
need new approaches tailored to the IoT reality: an access
control scheme should take into account the existence of
malicious apps on smartphones and/or integration hubs, and
the possibility of malicious IoT devices within the LAN. At
the same time, any solution should be backward-compatible:
it is impractical to assume that all existing devices can be
upgraded to seamlessly work with the new router/hub.
VIII. RELATED WORK
[92] and [93] emphasized the layered security architecture
analysis and available security solutions, respectively. Other
works, like [94], [95], [96], appeared at the early stage of
the mobile era before the explosion of IoT device ownership.
Therefore, they inevitably miss current security challenges.
Also, most of these works are short of real-world IoT attack
cases to support their discussions. Instead, our collected
attack incidents from multiple sources could offer the security
community a more complete understanding of the challenges
the IoT ecosystem is facing today. Additionally, the sound
assessment properties we designed could systemize future
reviews on IoT threats and solutions.
IoT security involves many elements, and every single
one could be a separate research topic. Granjal et al. [97]
focused on existing protocols and mechanisms to secure
communications in IoT. Singh et al. [98] offered security
considerations for the IoT architecture considering participating
cloud services. [99] presents a policy report on IoT; Yan
et al. [100] delivered a survey on IoT trust management
technologies, and Mukherjee [101] is mainly concerned with
physical-layer security, especially the resource-constrained
secrecy coding and secret-key generation. Moreover, Denning et
al. [102] reviewed potential computer security attacks against in-
home technologies and presented a framework for the security
risk evaluation. Weber [103] studied the legal challenges posed
by the secure implementation of IoT architecture. On the aspect
of usable security, Ur et al. [104] found that smart home devices
have their own isolated access control and fail to support user
understanding for home access control. In contrast with these
works and instead of focusing on a single attack surface in
IoT, this SoK performs a comprehensive study on reported IoT
attacks and defense to identify the major security and privacy
problem areas in the space.
Other works focus on security issues of particular IoT devices
or architectures. For instance, Rushanan et al. [105] surveyed
publications related to security and privacy in implantable
medical devices (IMDs) and health-related body area networks
(BANs). Sadeghi et al. [106] pointed out the security risks
on Industrial IoT systems, and Wang et al. [107] presented a
survey of cyber security threats against the Smart Grid.
Other related surveys on IoT security and dependability
include wearable devices [108], IoT routing [109], smart
homes [110], embedded system design [111], etc. For reviews
in the general domain of IoT, we refer the interested readers to
the solid works of Atzori et al. [112] and Perera et al. [113].
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we report our study on the state of the art
in consumer-facing IoT security and privacy. To provide a
comprehensive picture of the environment and capture both
current practices and new threats and defenses, we collected
not only relevant academic papers but also thousands of
industry reports in the form of white papers, news articles
and blog posts. To serve this purpose, we built a literature
retrieval and mining tool which gathers relevant online data,
extracts semantic information and clusters similar articles
together to form stories. We scrutinized the most reported attack
incidents from the industry and the academic research and
propose a number of properties which we use to systematically
assess the state of the art. We identified and defined five
problem areas in this domain: LAN Mistrust, Environment
Mistrust, App Over-privilege, No/Weak Authentication and
Implementation Flaws. Our assessment led to five security and
privacy observations which we utilize to suggest future research
directions and expected security practices for building IoT
systems. Observations include the lack of substantial studies on
emerging IoT application platforms, lack of security solutions
for connected cars and the need for device-independent
access control solutions to tackle local adversaries. We further
highlighted the need for academics, industry representatives
and legislators to work together towards a security framework
for consumer IoT devices. To facilitate future research, we plan
to make available online all our collected data (IoT security
articles and IoT apps) and statistics.
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APPENDIX A
IOT APP SECURITY IN THE WILD
The most prevalent UIP in the consumer IoT ecosystem
is the smartphone. IoT devices are usually controlled by
mobile applications, developed either by the devices’ respective
vendors or other third parties. Our assessment of attack
incidents reveal that a notable number of attacks are possible
due to hardcoded credentials [51], lack of encryption [114] and
insecure SSL implementations[39] among others. If a device
is vulnerable due to any of these, this would be visible in their
mobile application implementations as well. Therefore, instead
of limiting our focus on published vulnerabilities, we go a
step further and conduct our own real-world study to gain a
complete understanding of IoT security. In particular, we collect
all apps we could find that connect to IoT devices and perform
a security analysis. Although mobile app analysis is not a new
topic, there is no previous work focusing on the security of
IoT apps. Note that apps might be developed either for iOS
or Android. Due to the existence of well-established Android
application analysis techniques, we focus on the Android IoT
apps.
App Collection. Collecting apps that connect to IoT devices is
non-trivial. For example, there is no easy way to automatically
discover and distinguish such apps on the official Android
app store (Google Play) or other third-party markets. In our
work, we utilize smarthomedb.com [10]: smarthomedb retains
a mapping between smart home devices and links to their
corresponding official mobile apps. We leverage this to build a
crawler to automatically collect these links and download the
apk files from Google Play. This results in 236 unique apps.
To increase coverage, one could leverage Google Play’s search
engine with relevant keywords. However, such an approach
results in a list of apps most of which are irrelevant. In contrast,
we utilize another IoT integration platform (iotlist.co [9]). We
build a tool to automatically extract each listed product’s title
which then use it as the search term in Google Play. Then,
the tool retrieves the first result of the query and downloads
the corresponding apk file. Lastly, it discards apps that do not
fall within the House & Home, Health & Fitness, or
Lifestyle Google Play categories, which IoT apps usually
reside in. This results in 87 more unique IoT apps.
Our approach yields 323 unique IoT apps in total. To validate
our tool’s effectiveness in retrieving relevant apps, we randomly
select 50 discovered apps. We then manually check their
descriptions on Google Play. We find that all of them do
indeed control IoT devices.
App Analysis. Our analysis concentrates on communication
security and data protection. Towards this end, we build a static
analysis tool based on Androguard APIs [115] which combines
several reputable techniques [116], [117], [118]. Our tool totals
1,700 lines of Python code. The tool checks for security issues
with respect to three main areas: SSL (S) implementation;
Bluetooth (B); Cryptography (C). In particular, the checks
are implemented as 16 distinct policies which we summarize
below:
• Policy-S1: App does not use any SSL connection.
• Policy-S2: Exist URLs that are not SSL protected.
• Policy-S3: Exist custom SSL HostnameVerifier.
• Policy-S4: Exist SSL AllowAllHostnameVerifier.
• Policy-S5: Exist custom SSL TrustManager.
• Policy-S6: Exist insecure SSLSocketFactory.
• Policy-S7: Exist custom SSL (WebView) error handlers.
• Policy-B1: Exist insecure Bluetooth RFCOMM sockets.
• Policy-C1: App does not use any crypto library.
• Policy-C2: Exist suspicious Base64 “encrypted” strings.
• Policy-C3: Exist constant / insecure PRNG seeds.
• Policy-C4: Exist insecure encryption modes (like ECB).
• Policy-C5: Exist non-random IV for CBC encryption.
• Policy-C6: Exist constant encryption keys.
• Policy-C7: Exist constant salts for PBE.
• Policy-C8: Exist insufficient iterations for PBE.
To avoid the interference of irrelevant code, we use a blacklist
of more than 100 popular third-party libraries that are not
related to network connection or cryptography functions. Most
of these are ad libraries, analytics libraries, or user interface
libraries.
Results and Findings. Our analysis results are alarming as
illustrated in Figure 5. Nearly 90% of the IoT apps trigger at
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Fig. 5: Detection rate of each policy in IoT apps
Most of the IoT apps have security implementation issues.
This suggests either a lack of security expertise in IoT
vendors or the absence of security design and testing in
the development process.
least one policy in our detection. In particular, approximately
44% of the apps do not invoke any crypto function to protect
their data (Policy-C1). Among the apps that do use encryption,
almost 60% have insecure implementations of encryption
ciphers (Policy-C2∼S8), and 9% use hardcoded encryption
keys (Policy-C6). The situation is much worse regarding SSL
implementations. About half of the apps have at least one SSL
related flaw (Policy-S2∼S7) or do not use SSL at all for their
communications (Policy-S1).
Even though these issues do not necessarily mean that the
end IoT devices are exploitable, they do at the very least
illustrate that security is in most cases cursively implemented
if it is at all. We believe that a unified IoT framework involving
industry security standards could help alleviate those issues
and guide the development process for IoT apps and device
firmwares. To facilitate future studies on IoT, we will release
all collected apps online [6].
